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WAR IN THE FAR EAST
THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION IN MANCHURIA

The Soviet Challenge to Capitalism

MANCHURIA lies in the northeastern corner of China. Between it and the United States lies the vast Pacific. But dollars have annihilated distance and brought Manchuria into the
life of the American worker. American capitalism in its rapid
expansion abroad has come into conflict with rival capitalist
powers, and Manchuria is one of the points where the conflict
is sharpest. Not only is Manchuria the battleground of rival
imperialist nations ; it is also a strategic sector in the attack
which the imperialist powers are directing against the Soviet
Union.
Daily the campaign against the Soviet Union gathers momentum. Under the guise of safeguarding religious liberty,
political democracy, the virtue of womanhood or the purity
of the white race, the capitalist press of the world carries on
a relentless propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union ;
mobilizes mass sentiment for a holy crusade.
The slogans change. Outworn myths no longer useful in
whipping up anti-Soviet sentiment are discarded for new ones.
Tales of atrocities against innocent priests are substituted for
stories about the nationalization of women. There is a rapid
turnover in the lies which serve as pretexts for the anti-Soviet
campaign; but the reason for the campaign remains fundamentally the same. The Soviet Union is a workers' dictatorship
engaged in building socialism. It is a challenge to the capitalist
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world, to the bankers and factory owners and their . press,
priests and rabbis. Every day the friction between these two
worlds sJ:larpens. Every step in the socialist construction of
the Soviet Union, every economic program realized, every
factory constructed by Soviet workers is a challenge to the
capitalist world.
Now the Soviet Union is engaged in the difficult task of
collectivizing agriculture. For the tiny farms, owned by individual peasants, worked by primitive methods, it is substituting collective farms, owned by groups of peasants and
operated scientifically. That means a huge stride forward in
socialist construction. It means the death of the peasant
proprietor and the birth of a new type of peasant, a soCially
conscious worker in a collective enterprise; it means shorter
hours and higher standards of living for the peasant; it means
the incorporation of the peasant into the socialist fabric of
the Soviet Union; it means scientific farming, increased production and large wheat exports.
The revolution in Russian agriculture coupled with the
amazingly rapid development of Soviet industry has alarmed
world capitalism. Leslie Urquhart, well-known British capitalist, recently wrote:
We are all firmly imbued with the opinion that if the Soviet government succeeds wilh its five year program of rehabilitation of
Russian industry, this will put into their hands financial resources
that will destroy or at least do the greatest possible harm to our
civilization.

Urquhart is right. The triumph of socialist construction in
the Soviet Union is a blow to capitalism. The Soviet Union
has its difficulties. Nevertheless, it strides ahead building its
industry, collectivizing its farms, increasing production, raising standards of living. Unable to obtain credits abroad, it
increases its exports and undersells its capitalist competitors
in order to obtain funds to purchase the machinery which it
needs. Soviet exports are still relatively small; but they be-
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come increasingly significant in view of the capitalist struggle
for world markets. European capitalists have for some time
expressed alarm at the possibility of increased Soviet exports.
Now even a large number of American business men are agitating against Soviet products. Pennsylvania mine owners are
demanding the exclusion of Soviet coal, and northwestern
lumber barons are trying to prevent the importation of Soviet
lumber. The Journal of Commerce expresses alarm at the rapid
growth of Soviet iron and steel production ; the midwest
Economist declares that the proposed increase in Russian
wheat production menaces American agriculture. This agitation against Soviet exports is not yet very great; but it represents an important tendency. Capitalist organs like the Business Week point out that the development of Soviet trade
"not only strengthens the Soviet regime, but lays the way
open to destructive price competition."
Within the capitalist countries there is a steady intensification of the forces impelling the campaign against the Soviet
Union. Economic crises, an inevitable feature of capitalist
economy, decreased wages, the growth of unemployment and
the consequent shrinkage of home markets all accelerate the
drive for foreign markets and intensify the campaign against
the Soviet Union which enters the export field as a young
but formidable rival. At the same time the capitalists find an
energetic anti-Soviet campaign necessary to stem the growing
restlessness of workers in their countries. The Soviet Union,
with its socialized planned economy, can increase wages, decrease hours, and reduce unemployment while increasing production. In the capitalist countries, increased production is
achieved only by speeding up workers, lowering wages, increasing unemployment and lengthening hours. To keep the
masses of workers from realizing these facts, to stem the
growth of revolutionary sentiment, the propaganda agencies
maintain their barrage against the Soviet Union.
The anti-Soviet campaign is waged along the diplomatic as
well as the economic front. Press correspondents reported that
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the "shadow of the Soviet Union" loomed large at the London
naval conference. That is probably quite true. France and
England have created elaborate political alliances aimed
against the Soviet Union. The general staffs of the Baltic
states, of France and Poland, of Germany and Britain are
busy preparing plans for military movements against the
Soviet Union. In the Far East, Japan, through her control
of an elaborate network of railways in Korea and Manchuria,
can strike at the Soviet Union.
Imperialist Rivalries

The joint campaign against the U.S.S.R. does not mean
that the powers are united. The imperialist nations are sharply
divided among themselves. Hoover and MacDonald may issue
unctuous statements that "war between the United States and
Great Britain is unthinkable." But they know better. They
build cruisers. The London Conference clearly revealed the
intensification of the forces driving the United States and
Great Britain to war. Their struggle for markets, colonies, raw
materials, and military superiority is more intense than ever.
The London Conference, far from reducing naval armaments,
increased the fighting strength of the American, British and
Japanese navies.
One of the richest prizes over which the imperialist powers
are struggling is China. And in no part of China have international rivalries been sharper than in the Manchurian provinces. One bloody war has already been fought over Manchuria.
Another one may be.
The Struggle for Manchuria

Manchuria consists of the three northeastern provinces of
China-Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungkiang. It is for the most
part a vast undulating plain, whose fertile soil is suitable for
the cultivation of wheat, millet, maize, barley and legumes ;
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but more important economically are the mountains that
flank Manchuria on the east and west. Rich in lumber and
containing valuable deposits of iron and coal, these mountains, particularly the East Mountain Highlands, near the
Manchurian border, have been coveted by foreign powers.
Only at the south does Manchuria touch the sea. Here the
Liaotung Peninsula juts far into the Gulf of Pechili, providing
an outlet for Manchurian agricultural produce, iron, coal and
lumber. Here are two excellent ports, Dairen and Port Arthur,
both free from ice all the year round, and therefore of great
strategic importance. To the east and south of Manchuria
lies Korea, and east of Korea across the Japan Sea is Japan,
the only industrialized nation in the Orient. To the north of
Manchuria are the vast Siberian plains absorbed by the Russian Empire in its march towards the east.
The struggle for control of Manchuria began as early as
rBgs. Manchuria was the point where the Japanese Empireattempting to extend its control on the Asiatic mainlandand the Russian Empire met and clashed. Japan, a highly
industrialized nation, relatively overpopulated, poor in raw
materials, looked eagerly towards the Asiatic mainland as a
market for its manufactured goods and capital exports, as a
source of raw materials and a convenient outlet for its surplus
population. Japan needed iron and coal for its factories. These
it possessed in insufficient quantities. Across the sea lay Manchuria, with coal resources equal to Japan's (about four billion tons) and iron resources ten times as large as Japan's.
Nominally Manchuria was a part of the decadent Chinese
empire; actually it was a rich prize to be seized by an enterprising imperialist power.
Japan first attempted to gain control of Korea directly
across the sea. In the Sino-Japanese War (r894) that followed
Japanese expansion in Korea, the Chinese were completely
routed. By the treaty of Shimonoseki China was compelled to
recognize the independence of Korea and to cede to Japan the

7

Liaotung Peninsula with its rich mines and strategic seaports.
The treaty alarmed the Russian imperialists, who themselves
wished to obtain the Liaotung Peninsula in their quest for a
"warm water" outlet on the Asiatic continent, as an eventual
substitute for Vladivostok, ice-bound more than half the year.
At that time, too, the Russian government was planning to
extend the great trans-Siberian railroad along the banks of
the Amur River to Vladivostok. The construction of the railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok would shorten the
distance s6o miles, carry the railroad through a more productive country and extend Russian imperialist influence into
Manchuria. These were the considerations that prompted Russia, later joined by France and Germany, to warn Japan that
the cession of the Liaotung Peninsula was a menace to the
peace of the Far East and therefore highly inadvisable. Japan
knew how to take a hint and returned Liaotung, receiving
instead a large indemnity.
Having forced her rival from Manchuria, Russia now proceeded to grab it herself. Russia's first step was to form the
Russo-Chinese Bank in St. Petersburg. In addition to ordinary
banking operations the bank was authorized to collect duties
and coin money in China and to acquire railway and telegraph concessions. Russia utilized the bank to secure the valuable Chinese Eastern Railroad concession in 1896. According
to the secret treaty with China which authorized the railroad,
one of the purposes of the road was "to facilitate the access
of Russian land troops to menaced points in case of war with
Japan." As early as 1896, the Russian imperialists clearly
realized that the struggle for Manchuria was certain to end
in war.
The Chinese Eastern agreement was so broad that it gave
Russian imperialism control over the whole of northern Manchuria: Ostensibly the railroad was a private enterprise.
Actually it was controlled by the Czarist government. The
statutes of the railroad conformed to Russian law. The rail-
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road itself was administered by a Russian manager. Russian
troops moved through the railroad zone without interference.
Russian traders shipped goods to and from Manchuria without
paying the full Chinese customs duties. Russian bureaucrats
and generals dictated Manchurian life and politics. By subsequent agreements, Russia pushed her way farther south. In
r8g8 she acquired the right to extend the Chinese Eastern
to the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula and secured a twenty-fiveyear lease over Port Arthur and Dairen. Thus Russia realized
her ambition to extend her railway system from European
Russia to ice-free ports on the Pacific.
During the construction of the Chinese Eastern, the railway
zone was virtually reduced to the status of a Russian colony.
Russians ruled the territory. Villages and towns were laid out
and populated by Russian immigrants. But it is not enough
to loot; one must safeguard one's spoils. In r899 Russia
reached an agreement with Britain. She promised not to seek
railroad concessions in the Yangtse basin, in return for which
Britain promised not to seek railway concessions in Manchuria. During the Boxer rebellion, a result of Chinese restlessness under foreign exploitation, Russian troops poured into
Manchuria and slaughtered thousands of Chinese. Even after
the imperialist powers had crushed the rebellion, Russia continued to maintain troops in Manchuria. Japan, which was
apprehensively watching the Russian advance to the south
and Russian attempts to gain a foothold in Korea, demanded
the withdrawal of Russian troops, at the same time offering
to recognize Russian "interests" in Manchuria if Russia would
recognize Japanese "interests" in Korea. When Russia refused
to make a definite reply, Japan, with the tacit support of her
ally, England, declared war, won a decisive victory and
wrested from Russia the Liaotung lease, Russian railway
rights in South Manchuria, and valuable coal and iron mines.
Thus South Manchuria became a Japanese "sphere of influence."
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"Uncle Sam" in Manchuria
In this early struggle for the control of Manchuria, the
United States took no active part. The United States at this
time was interested in China chiefly as a market for exports
rather than investment. She was not particularly concerned
over the scramble for Manchurian railways; but she was worried about the special trade privileges and reduced tariff rates
which other powers had wrested from China. In 1899, the
American Secretary of State John Hay, as spokesman for
American manufacturers interested in exports to China, addressed his "open door" notes to the principal imperialist
powers, asking them to guarantee equal opportunities for trade
in China and to permit the application of Chinese customs
duties within their spheres of influences. These demands reflected the dominant interests of the United States in China,
which at the time were manufacturing and commercial rather
than financial. Hay was quite near-sighted. He ignored the
battle for the control of Chinese railways and left to his
successors the job of securing for American bankers as well
as industrialists "equal rights" to exploit China. For the next
two decades, the State Department fought furious diplomatic
battles to secure the privilege of participating in the scramble
for Chinese loans and railways.
One American authority, C. Walter Young, expressing the
views of the State Department, writes:
The period from 1905
evitable conflict between
assertion of treaty rights
in themselves, constituted
of policy characterized as

to 1915 exhibited in Manchuria the inthe policy of the "open door" and the
which, while legally valid and enforceable
in fact limitations on the general assertion
the "open door."

Translate these legalistic terms into concrete political terms
and one gets an accurate picture of the period-i.e., a long
drawn out struggle between the European powers, which had
an early start in China, and the United States, a late conIO

tender in the impeyialist struggle. The United States enunciated the noble doctrine of the "open door" as a means of
edging its way into the battle for Chinese concessions.
In 1905 E. H. Harriman, American railroad magnate who
with his bankers, Kuhn, Loeb & Co., had helped finance Japan
in its war with Russia, attempted to gain control of the South
Manchurian railroad as part of an ambitious scheme for
establishing a round-the-world transportation system. Harriman dreamed of eventually reaching an agreement with the
trans-Siberian railroad and linking it by means of the South
Manchurian with his transcontinental system by means of a
fleet of steamers on the Pacific and from the Baltic across the
Atlantic. In 1905 li.e succeeded in reaching a tentative agreement with Japanese representatives for joint AmericanJapanese control of the South Manchurian; but the Japanese
government, afraid to permit the United States a foothold in
Manchuria, dropped the plan. Harriman then unsuccessfully
tried to buy the Chinese Eastern from the Czarist government.
Not at all discouraged by these failures, the Harriman interests decided to build a railroad of their own. In October,
1909, they received permission from the Chinese government
to build a railroad from Chinchow, on the coast of South
Manchuria, up to Aigun on the Russian border. American
bankers, headed by J.P. Morgan & Co. and Kuhn, Loeb & Co.,
were to finance the railroad; a British construction firm was
to build it.
It was this railroad project that Philander C. Knox, then
Secretary of State, attempted to use as a springboard for one
of the most ambitious schemes in American diplomacy. Speaking for the American bankers, Knox proposed that China
borrow money from the principal powers for the purpose of
buying all the foreign controlled railroads in Manchuria. He
proposed that representatives of the powers supervise the railroads during the term of the loan. This scheme for taking
the Manchurian railways from Russia and Japan and placing
them in the hands of American and British bankers went
II

under the euphonious name of "neutralization." Fine words,
decided Russia and Japan, are very lovely; but railroads are
railroads. The Czarist government flatly rejected the Knox
proposals, declaring that "the establishment of international
administration and control of the Manchurian railroads would
seriously injure Russian interests," ~nd that the proposed
Chinchow-Aigun railroad had distinct "strategic and political"
importance damaging to the interests of the Chinese Eastern.
The Japanese protest was equally strong and when Britain
and France supported their allies, Japan and Russia, the
United States was compelled to drop the Chinchow-Aigun
proposal and the Knox scheme. The "neutralization" scheme
was dropped only temporarily. As we shall see later, "neutralization" remained the keynote of American policy in Manchuria.
Consortiums

Although defeated in their attempts to acquire control of
Manchuria's railroads, American bankers succeeded in a simultaneous struggle to participate in a six power loan (consortium) for Chinese currency reform and for the promotion
of industrial enterprises in Manchuria. But this victory was
also short-lived. The American bankers were forced to withdraw from the consortium when President Wilson in a statement issued March, 1913, withdrew the support of the American government, declaring that the conditions of the loan
"seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative independence of China itself." Wilson's decision reflected the
dominant capitalistic interests of the United States, which at
the time were manufacturing and commercial rather than
financial. After the World War, when the United States
emerged as a large capital-exporting country, Wilson changed
his tune and inspired the formation of a new consortium.
In the meantime, American attempts to penetrate Manchuria alarmed Russia and Japan and forced the two powers,
I :I

who a few years earlier had fought a bloody war, into a
virtual alliance. Japan recognized northern Manchuria as a
Russian sphere of influence, in return for which Russia recognized South Manchuria as a Japanese sphere of influence.
The two powers presented a solid front in opposition to the
Harriman schemes and the Knox "neutralization" proposals.
During this period, Japan extended her influence in Manchuria and acquired control of a number of important railroads
together with valuable mining and lumber concessions. In
1915 Japan took advantage of the preoccupation of the powers
with the war in Europe to present China with an ultimatum
demanding among other things the right to purchase land in
South Manchuria, an option on all railway construction and
loans in South Manchuria, and 99-year leases of Port Arthur
and Dairen. China resisted for four months. Then when Japan
threatened war, she granted the Japanese demands in treaties
signed May 25, 1915.
Effects of the Bolshevik Revolution

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 marked a new phase
in the international relations of Manchuria. The Russian
workers and peasants overthrew Russian capitalism and with
it the imperialist exploitation of colonial peoples. In the place
of imperialist Russia stood the Soviet Union offering to deal
with China and other colonial countries on terms of complete equality.
The imperialist powers left no stone unturned in their
effort to overthrow the workers' and peasants' government,
which challenged the very existence of capitalism. A barrage
of lying propaganda, blockades, subsidized counter-revolutions and actual military intervention were all tried in an
effort to restore capitalism in Russia.
At the same time the imperialist powers saw an opportunity to seize some of the Czarist spoils for which they hungered. By agreements with China in March and September,
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1918, Japan established a joint Sino-Japanese bureau to make
"arrangements" for the transportation of troops to Siberia
where the United States, Japan and other allied powers were
cooperating with the White Guards. While cooperating against
the U.S.S.R., the allied powers were suspiciously watching one
another. The United .States, fearing that Japan was extending its influence in northern Manchuria and Siberia, proposed that an inter-allied commission supervise the Siberian
railways, including the Chinese Eastern. In January, 1919,
an inter-allied commission was formed consisting of representatives of each of the powers having troops in Siberia.
This general agreement provided for two boards, a Technical
Board and a Military Transportation Board, the former for
the purpose of "administering technical and economic" management of the railways, and the latter for coordinating military transportation. This system was put into effect in March,
1919. John F. Stevens, an American engineer, was made president of the Technical Board.
Simultaneously, American attempts to penetrate Manchuria were revealed in the proposals for a new consortium,
revived by President Wilson, who in 1913 had opposed American participation because the consortium threatened the "administrative independence" of China. American-Japanese rivalry in the Far East was apparent throughout the course of
the consortium negotiations. Japan at first sought to exclude
South Manchuria from the scope of the· consortium; but was
unsuccessful. After long negotiations, she had to content herself with assurances from the United States and Britain that
they would not countenance any action by the consortium
that was prejudicial to the national defense and economic
welfare of Japan. These assurances were broad and elastic
enough for any interpretation.
The new four-power consortium signed in 1920 contained
no special reservations regarding Manchuria and was therefore a diplomatic victory for the United States, which had
at last won the right to participate in the financing of Man-
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churian railways. This was not merely a paper victory. Even
though the consortium in the five years of its existence floated
no loan affecting Manchuria, those provinces remain a field
for railroad investment. It is a country with a rapidly growing population and with rich natural resources. At the end
of the 19th century the population of Manchuria was only
r4,ooo,ooo; by 1927 the population had increased to 24,soo,ooo. The rich soil of central Manchuria is attracting millions of Chinese immigrants from the crowded provinces of
Chihli and Shantung. In the growth of Manchuria, railroads
play a vital role and offer an excellent field for investment.
The United States won its diplomatic victory at the cost
of Japanese suspicion and hatred. American-Japanese rivalry
in the Far East was extremely acute. Both countries launched
large naval construction programs. Those were the days of
the "Yellow Peril," when the jingo press of this country
yelped for war with Japan. Diplomats and admirals frankly
talked about the possibility of war. This situation culminated in the Washington Conference of 1921-I922. The Japanese, realizing that they could not compete with the United
States in naval construction, agreed to evacuate Siberia and
recognize the principles of the "open door" as applying to
Manchuria as well as other parts of China.
On the question of the Chinese Eastern the United States
was less successful. The American delegation tried to push
through a proposal that smacked of the Knox "neutralization" scheme. It called for an international finance committee
which should "exercise general financial control and be entrusted with the trusteeship which was assumed in 1919 and
which cannot be relinquished until general recognition by
the powers of a Russian government." Had this plan been
successfully carried out, the Chinese Eastern would still be
under the control of the imperialist powers, since no general
recognition of the Soviet Union has occurred. The Chinese
delegates balked at this proposal and compelled the conference to adopt a meaningless resolution for the better "pro-
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tection of the railroad." At the same time the other powers
adopted a resolution reserving the "right to insist hereafter
upon the responsibility of China for the performance or nonperformance of obligations towards foreign stockholders,
bondholders and creditors of the Chinese Eastern.". Thus
for the second time the United States was unsuccessful in
its attempts to "neutralize" the Chinese Eastern Railway.
In October of the same year, inter-allied supervision of the
Chinese Eastern was brought to a close and the railroad was
administered under an agreement between China and the
white guard directors of the Russo-Asiatic Bank who had
fled to Paris after the revolution. The emigres claimed ownership of the railways even though they owned only a very
small portion of the stock of the Russo-Asiatic Bank and
even though the Soviet Government had nationalized all of
the Russian banks.

The Soviet Union and China Make a Treaty
While the imperialists were quarreling over Chinese
spoils, the U.S.S.R. negotiated with China for relations between the two countries on terms of complete equality and
for the revision of all unequal treaties foisted upon China
by the Czarist government. In treaties signed in May, 1924,
the Soviet Union renounced all special privileges and concessions in China, surrendered its extraterritorial rights and
gave up all claims to the indemnities wrested from China
after the Boxer rebellion. The two countries also signed an
agreement providing for joint operation of the Chinese Eastern, in which the U.S.S.R. returned to China all of the privileges wrested by the Czars, including the maintenance of
troops in the railway area. The U.S.S.R. agreed to assume
responsibility for all debts incurred before 1917. Soon after
the agreements were concluded, the new management introduced the eight-hour day on the railroad and other measures
for the protection of the workers. (The Chinese Eastern is
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still the only railroad in China where the eight-hour day
prevails.) Schools and houses were built for workers and
trade unions and cooperative organizations established.
The powers which clung to their privileges regarded the
Soviet Union's policy with respect to colonial peoples as a
blow to imperialist exploitation, which is such an essential
part of modern capitalist economy. Even before the final
signature of the May treaties, several governments, including
the United States, protested to China claiming that the
treaties violated the Washington Conference resolution holding China responsible for the debts of the Chinese Eastern
Railway. (China, it will be remembered, had never agreed
to the resolution.)
The United States protest was based on claims that the
United States had spent about four million dollars on the
Chinese Eastern and Siberian Railways under the authority
of the Inter-Allied Technical Board. This was a doubtful
claim, to say the least, since the board had spent the money to
further its military expedition against the Soviet Union. In
reply to the American protest, China reminded the United
States that matters concerning the Chinese Eastern were for
the disposition of the U.S.S.R. and China alone.
The relations between the U.S.S.R. and China, although
officially friendly, were frequently strained after the signing
of the treaties. From 1924 to 1927, there were many cases of
treaty violations by the Manchurian war lord, Chang Tso-lin.
The Manchurian authorities continued to protect and encourage the organization of military detachments of Russian
Tsarist emigres. In 1925, the manager of the Chinese Eastern
Railroad, a Soviet citizen, was arrested because he refused to
transport Chang's troops without payment.
While the imperialists and the war lords intrigued against
the Soviet Union, workers', peasants', students', and even middle class organizations hailed the Soviet Union as the friend of
Chinese nationalism. In 192 5, the Central Committee of the
Kuomintang, which at that time was still conducting a genuine
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struggle for Chinese nationalism, passed a resolution declaring
that the only government with which it coufd cooperate was
the U.S.S.R.

The Kuomintang Betrays the Revolution
The amicable relations between the Soviet Union and the
Kuomintang lasted until that organization betrayed the
Chinese revolution and became a counter-revolutionary
medium for imperialist intrigue. In 1926 and early in 1927,
the nationalist armies swept northwards from their base in
Canton and gained control of the Yangtse Valley. More significant than the military victories was the awakening of the
millions of workers and peasants throughout southern and
central China. Hundreds of labor and peasant unions sprang
into being. Gigantic strikes shut down the mills where men,
women and children had toiled twelve, fourteen and sixteen
hours a day. Chinese as well as foreign owned mills were
closed. It was at this point that the Chinese bourgeoisie and
the careerist generals of the Kuomintang betrayed the nationalist movement, butchered thousands of workers' and
peasants' leaders, and set up a reactionary government at
Nanking. Since 1927, the Chinese war lords, affiliated and
unaffiliated with the Kuomintang, have repeatedly violated
their treaties with the Soviet Union. They have raided Soviet
diplomatic quarters, arrested and murdered Soviet citizens and
looted Soviet property. In April, 1927, the Chinese authorities,
with the written permission of the foreign diplomatic corps,
raided the Soviet consulate in Peking. The Soviet Government
in a protest note expressed its policy towards China-a policy
to which it has since consistently adhered. The Soviet note
said:
Any imperialist government representatives having been submitted
to similar acts of violence, would have retaliated with acts of most
atrocious reprisals. Though the Soviet Government possesses sufficient technical resources to resort to enforcing its demands by
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repressive measures, it nevertheless declares that it positively desists from such measures. . . . The Soviet Government was, is, and
will be guided in its policy by the interests of the toiling masses
of the whole world and among others by the interests of the Chinese
people and the working classes of all countries. In reply to the
Peking provocation, the Soviet Government declares that it will not
let itself be provoked by anybody and will by all means maintain
peace among the nations. The Soviet Government does not doubt
that in its endeavor to maintain peace it will have the concerted
support of the toiling masses of all countries, and among others,
'
first of all the people of China and of the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet Government recalled its charge d'affaires and
thereafter maintained only consular relations with China.
Nevertheless the provocative raids on Soviet diplomatic quarters continued. In December, 1927, the Kuomintang war lords
raided the Soviet consulate in Canton and arrested the consul-general. The strained relations between the U.S.S.R. and
China continued until in 1929 they culminated in the seizure
of the Chinese Eastern by the Chinese and the subsequent
critical situation marked by the intervention of the powers.
Mr. Stimson and the Kellogg Pact
Economically the United States is the most powerful
nation in the world. Its rapid rise to world supremacy, its
emergence as the money center and chief manufacturing and
exporting nation of the world is a story that has been frequently told. The United States has been less proficient in the
development of political instruments for expressing its world
hegemony. Many of its policies still trail the umbilical cords
of the nineteenth century which gave them birth. Now the
United States is attempting to make up for this deficiency; it
is revising old policies; whipping old doctrines into conformity
with its role as the most powerful imr}erialist nation in the
world. In opposition to the League of Nations dominated by
British and French imperialism, the United States, under the
guise of promoting world peace, is developing the Kellogg
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Pact as an instrument for expressing its world hegemony. In
the dispute between the Soviet Union and China resulting
from the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railroad by the
Chinese, the United States intervened in spite of the opposition
of Japan and Germany, with two purposes in view: (1) to
revive its old schemes for the "neutralization" of the Chinese
Eastern; ( 2) to develop the Kellogg Pact as a powerful
weapon against its imperialist rivals.
As regards the second point, the well-informed correspondent
of the Baltimore Sun who reported the London Conference
wrote, late in December, 1929, as follows:
Put briefly, the situation as viewed unofficially here is that the
United States within the past summer has set up a Kellogg Pact
machinery for maintaining the peace of the world which threatens to
rival the League of Nations.
This machinery, despite the fact that the French scornfully point
out that it rests only on public opinion, is a powerful one when
dominated by the United States. Furthermore, Mr. Stimson has indicated that the United States intends to dominate it as long as the
Hoover Administration remains in office.
Under this machinery, the United States, and the United States
alone, can decide whether it will throw its weight against a nation
embroiled in a dispute threatening the Kellogg Pact. To do this, it
does not need to take any vote on the question; it does not even
need to have the approval of all of the major powers, as illustrated
by the disapproval of Japan and Germany in advance of Secretary
Stimson's action regarding Manchuria. Finally, the machine is one
against which not even the United States Senate has raised its voice.
As opposed to this, the League of Nations machinery, which France
sees subordinated ... is a mechanism partly controlled by her.

The motives of the United States in intervening in the
Manchurian dispute can hardly be regarded as altruistic. It is
even possible that American interests played some role in the
seizure of the Chinese Eastern. Let us examine the dispute and
the nature of American intervention.
On May 2 7, Chinese police broke into the Soviet consulate
in Harbin, searched the premises, seized part of the correspondence of the consulate and arrested 39 Soviet citizens, in20

eluding a number of officials of the Chinese Eastern. The
Soviet Union sharply protested against the raid and announced
that in the future it would not recognize the extraterritorial
status of the Chinese embassy and consulates in the U.S.S.R.
While expressing its friendship for the Chinese people, the
Soviet Government warned the Nanking regime against "further trying the patience of the government of the U.S.S.R. by
provocative actions and the violation of treaties and agreements."
The Chinese war lords disregarded the Soviet warning.
Early in July, Chiang Kai-shek, the Nanking war lord, Chang
Hseuh-liang, virtual ruler of Manchuria, and Yen Shi-shan, a
powerful and ambitious military leader who was awaiting an
opportune moment to strike at Chiang, conferred in Peking
and apparently decided to seize the Chinese Eastern. The
motives of the war lords differed. Chiang, it seems, hoped to
unite the rival war lords by means of a common cause against
the Soviet Union and to strengthen the Nanking regime as
spokesman for China. Chang Hseuh-liang believed that the
seizure would strengthen his position in Manchuria. On July
10 the Chinese broke their treaty pledges and seized the
Chinese Eastern Railroad on the pretext that the Soviet Union
was carrying on Communist propaganda in Manchuria.
Chinese police seized the Soviet trade offices, destroyed the
trade union and cooperative organizations on the Chinese
Eastern and replaced the Soviet manager and assistant manager of the railroad with Chinese.

Railroad Interests
It is not unlikely that American interests were connected
with the seizure of the railroad. On April 4, three months
before the Chinese confiscated the Chinese Eastern, the New
York Times announced that the Nanking government had
consulted American railroad interests with regard to the re2I

organization of the railroad along "American lines." It had
selected J. J. Mantell, formerly vice-president of the Erie
Railroad, chiefly distinguished for breaking the Erie railwaymen's strike of 1920, to survey the Chinese government railroads including the Chinese Eastern. The Times neglected to
mention that the "railroad interests" consulted by the Nanking
government consisted of W. W. Atterbury, president of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, and L. F. Loree, president of the
Delaware and Hudson Company and its thirty-nine subsidiaries. Atterbury and Loree are two of the most aggressive railroad magnates in the country. Both are interested in the
development and control of railroads abroad. It is quite possible that there was no connection between the Mantell visit
and the seizure of the railroad; on the other hand, the hypothesis that these events were not unrelated is strengthened
by the traditional interest of American railroad magnates and
diplomats in the Chinese Eastern as an important "artery
of commerce" between Europe and the Far East. From the
days of Harriman and Knox to those of Atterbury and Stimson, the United States has consistently sought the "neutralization" of the Chinese Eastern.
Whether or not American interests were in any way connected with the seizure is yet unknown. But there is evidence
that the United States took advantage of the dispute between
the U.S.S.R. and China to revive its old proposals for the
"neutralization" of the railroad and when these fell through
did everything possible to hinder a settlement of the conflict.
Sino-Soviet relations reached a critical stage immediately
after the seizure of the railroad because of the Chinese refusal to restore the status quo and negotiate its dispute with
the Soviet Union. Three days after the Chinese militarists
seized the railroad, the Soviet Union addressed a sharp note
to China demanding the release of arrested Soviet citizens,
a conference to regulate all questions concerning the railroad
and the "immediate cancellation of all arbitrary orders re22

garding the railroad." The Soviet note demanded a reply
within three days. The Chinese answer was an insolent defense of the seizure of the railroad and an evasion of the
Soviet Union's demands for a conference. On July 17 the
Soviet Union recalled its diplomatic and commercial representatives in China and suspended railway communications
between the two countries. During this exchange of diplomatic
notes, detachments of Chinese and White Russian troops were
mobilizing on the border.
It was at this stage that the United States first intervened.
On July 18, after preliminary conversations with the powers,
the United States Government reminded China and the Soviet
Union (through France, since the United States still refuses
to recognize the U.S.S.R.) that they were signatories of the
Kellogg Pact and expressed the hope that the U.S.S.R. and
China would settle their dispute peaceably. Both promised to
remain mindful of their obligations under the Kellogg Pact.
The basis for the action of the United States government
was not quite clear, since the Kellogg Pact had not yet gone
into effect. State Department officials advanced several theories
for the action of the United States. They first intimated that
the interest of the United States in the Manchurian crisis
was based on the Four-Power Treaty signed at the Washingtion Conference under which the United States, Great Britain,
France and Japan agreed to "communicate fully and frankly"
with respect to matters threatening their insular possessions
in the Pacific. This explanation was obviously too thin and
was subsquently abandoned. Then it was announced that in
intervening, the United States was solely concerned with the
terms of the Kellogg Pact. To the Kellogg Pact explanation,
Stanley Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the
State Department, subsequently added another excuse for
American intervention.
':By reason of the trusteeship assumed and exercised with
regard to the Chinese Eastern during years 1919-1922," Horn-
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beck declared, "the powers which participated in the Siberian
expedition, among them the United States, have a natural
concern, moral, at least, legal to some, with regard to developments which affect the Chinese Eastern Railway."
This explanation is extremely interesting since the United
States could on this basis claim a "moral" and possibly
"legal" concern in the trans-Siberian railroad (on Soviet soil),
parts of which were under the beneficent "trusteeship" of
the powers participating in the Siberian expedition.
The Secret "Aide Memoire"
Far more important that his communication of July 18
was a secret aide memoire which Stimson handed to the
diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, Japan, France,
Germany and Italy just one wee~ later. The contents of the
document were never made public, but their nature was revealed in press reports in various capitals, presumably emanating from the Japanese and German foreign offices. In its
issue of August 7, the Moscow Pravda printed a despatch
from Vienna declaring that Stimson's aide memoire had proposed the appointment of a neutral commission to study the
Manchurian dispute, that both Soviet and Chinese troops refrain from hostile action and that a body of five Soviet
citizens and five Chinese headed by a neutral chairman
operate the Chinese Eastern. Similar reports had appeared
several days earlier in the Japanese press. The well-informed
correspondent of the Baltimore Sun even charged that this
secret note had contained a veiled suggestion that the powers
assist China in purchasing the railroad. (Although the SinoSoviet agreements permit China to purchase the railroad in
19,32, they explicitly state that the purchase must be made
with Chinese funds .)
The State Department never denied these charges. It maintained
discreet silence about the contents of the aide

a
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mernoire and even refused to admit that such a document
existed. Hornbeck, in a speech about the Manchurian crisis,
referred to the press reports concerning its existence. "I am
not in any position to make any statement on that point," he
said. However, he did discuss the general position of the
United States regarding Manchurian railway politics. The
United States, he said, owns no railways in Manchuria nor
does it have any appreciable investments in Manchurian railways. Then he added:
Concerning the Chinese Eastern, it needs to be remembered that
physically and economically, it is not an independent railway unit;
it is a link in the one and only direct railway route from Europe,
across Siberia to the Asiatic ports of the Pacific Ocean. Concerning the South Manchurian line, it needs to be remembered that it
is the link between the trans-Siberian line and the ports and territories of China and Japan. These lines, therefore, no matter who
built them or who owns them or who administers them, are not
exclusively of Russian or exclusively of Japanese concern. They were
born in and of international politics. They serve not alone the people
or purposes of any one country. They are "public carriers" in a
much broader sense than that which is usually connoted by that expression. One war has already been fought because of them-a war
very expensive to the two belligerents and to the country upon whose
soil it was fought.

Hornbeck then emphasized "neutralization" as the tradi- tional policy of the United States in the international scramble for Manchurian railways. He stressed the Knox proposals
of 1909 and the inter-allied supervision of the Chinese Eastern from 1919-1922. The State Department refuses to discuss
the secret notes of July 2 5 but Hornbeck's speech suggests
the general nature of their contents.
According to the Baltimore Sun, Japan, Britain and Germany rejected the American proposals. Certainly the Japanese press made it clear that Japan resented the Stimson
proposals for international action in the Chinese Eastern dispute just as she had resented the Knox proposals of 1909.
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The Red Army Speaks
In the meantime, Chinese and White Guard detachments
crossed the Soviet border and raided Russian villages. The
Chinese authorities in Harbin arrested thousands of Soviet
citizens. Soviet notes to Germany cited numerous border
raids by the Chinese and the murder of scores of Soviet citizens. Through Germany, the Soviet Union repeatedly warned
China against further depredations but the Chinese disregarded these warnings, and continued their attacks. Then the
Soviet Union retaliated. Red Army detachments repulsed the
Chinese forces, crossed the border and pushed their way into
Manchuria. The Chinese retreated, looting towns as they
went. Having driven the Chinese far back into Manchuria,
the Red Army detachments began to withdraw.
Apparently the Chinese war lords were more readily persuaded by this show of force than by the series of diplomatic
protests which preceded it, for on November 2 I the press
reported that Chang Hseuh-liang, the Manchurian war lord,
was seeking to negotiate a settlement of the railroad dispute.
On December 2, as the negotiations were proceeding and
the Soviet troops completing their evacuation from Manchuria, the United States appealed to China and the Soviet
Union to settle the dispute peacefully and pointed to their
promises under the Kellogg Pact.
"The American government feels," the American communication said, "that the respect with which China and Russia
will hereafter be held in the good opinion of the world will
necessarily in great measure depend upon the way in which
they carry out these most sacred promises."
Stimson's gratuitous intervention was puzzling. For several
days before the United States despatched its communication,
it was apparent that the Soviet Union and China were negotiating for peaceful settlement of their dispute. Even State
Department officials acknowledged that a peaceful settlement

26

appeared to be near. State Department claims that the United
States was not informed of the negotiations are curious in
view of the press reports from various capitals reporting and
commenting on the imminent settlement of the dispute. On
November 2 7, the Associated Press reported from Moscow
that negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily. Two days
later the A.P. correspondent in Paris reported that the United
States, France and other powers had agreed to intervene but
had changed their plans because "Moscow and Mukden
opened direct negotiations." On the same day, Litvinov, acting Commissar of Foreign Affairs, handed the German ambassador a note replying to the offer of the Nanking government to negotiate the dispute and saying that since the
governor of Manchuria had agreed to Soviet terms, Nanking's
belated offers to settle the dispute amicably were superfluous.
Even reports from Washington, dated November 29, announced that the State Department had received information
that Soviet troop movements were small· and that the situation was not critical. These and numerous other reports appeared in the press. The State Department was perfectly
aware that the U.S.S.R. and Mukden were negotiating for
a peaceful settlement. Why then did the State Department
urge the Soviet Union and China to do precisely what they
were doing? One explanation advanced in the Soviet press is
that the United States desired to interfere with the negotiations. Another explanation is that the United States wished
to take advantage of the situation to strengthen the Kellogg
Pact and. establish a precedent for American intervention in
international disputes.
Great Britain and France associated themselves with the
United States and sent notes to the Soviet Union and China.
Germany and Japan refused to follow the lead of the United
States ; both indicating that the invocation of the Kellogg
Pact was superfluous in view of the direct negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and China.
In its reply to the Stimson note, the Soviet Union de-
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dared that the United States had intervened at a moment
when the U.S.S.R. and the Manchurian government were conducting direct negotiations for a settlement of their dispute
and pointed out that the Kellogg Pact did not authorize any
single state or group of states to act as the guardian of the
Pact. The Soviet note declared that the dispute between the
U.S.S.R. and China could only be settled by direct negotiations of the two powers concerned and expressed "amazement that the United States, which by its own will has no
official relations with the Soviet Union deems it possible to
apply to it with advice and counsel." The Soviet note was
dated December 3· On the same day-one day after Stimson's
intervention-a preliminary agreement for the settlement of
the dispute was reached. The Mukden government agreed to
adhere to the 1924 treaties and to dismiss the Chinese chairman of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern.
The next day Stimson in a statement to the press in reply
to the Soviet memorandum had the temerity to suggest that
the negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Mukden showed
that the "public opinion of the world is a live factor which
can promptly be mobilized and which has become a factor
of prime importance in the solution of problems and controversies which may arise between nations."
On December 22, China and the U.S.S.R. signed a protocol
providing for the restoration of the status quo with regard
to the administration of the Chinese Eastern.
Kellogg Pact-Weapon of Imperialist Struggle

American intervention in the Manchurian dispute revealed
a new trend in American foreign policy; it revealed the deliberate attempt of the United States to strengthen the Kellogg Pact as a weapon in its struggle for world domination.
The United States is not a member of the League of Nations,
which is controlled by France and Britain. In opposition to
the League, the United States must create an international
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political instrument which it can manipulate. The necessity
for such a policy becomes greater as the conflict between the
United States and its imperialist rivals grows more acute.
The Kellogg Pact, literally interpreted, is a meaningless
document. In vague language it "obliges" its signatories to
renounce war as an "instrument of national policy." As a
"peace pact" it means nothing except in so far as it provides imperialist statesmen with material for bombastic
hypocritical speeches about "peace," arouses pacifist illusions
and creates a smoke screen for the very diligent war preparations now in progress. But in the hands of the United States,
the Kellogg Pact becomes not merely a smoke screen, but an
effective instrument in the American struggle for world domination. Stimson's actions in the Manchurian dispute revealed
that the United States intends to use the pact as an excuse
for intervention in international disputes. What methods of
intervention can the United States use under the Kellogg
Pact? According to press reports Stimson's note of July z 5
suggested that an international committee investigate the
Manchurian dispute. The State Department never denied
these charges. The press also reported that Britain, Japan and
Germany flatly rejected Stimson's proposal, indicating that
the other imperialist powers refuse to permit the United
States to interpret the Kellogg Pact to suit its own interests.
Faced with this opposition, the United States is seeking to
"supplement" or "implement" the Kellogg treaty. Edwin L.
James, London correspondent for the New York Times, reportS! that in November, 1929, Stimson actually suggested to
the French government that steps be taken to strengthen the
pact. James writes:
Last fall when Washington .invoked the Kellogg Pact in the RussoChinese dispute, Mr. Stimson found a lack in the anti-war pact.
Based upon the force of public opinion, he saw that in order that
public opinion should make its force felt, it must have facts, and
in the Manchurian dispute it did not have facts. He then suggested
to M. Briand through Ambassador Claudel that provision should be
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made for inquiry and report. He still believes in the wisdom of this
policy, and, indeed, so does President Hoover. The French Foreign
Minister found it not feasible to renew these discussions at length
with Mr. Stimson here (London), for fear of complications. But who
will deny that he takes away from London very good assurance that
in the future-perhaps when the Senate has done with the naval
treaty-Washington and Paris may resume this project of giving
effect to the anti-war treaty.

In attempting to strengthen the Kellogg Pact as an instrument against the Soviet Union and rival imperialist powers,
and revive her scheme for the "neutralization" of the Chinese
Eastern, the United States further antagonized her imperialist rivals. Japan resented Stimson's attempt to intervene in
Manchuria, which she regards as her sphere of influence.

The "Russian Menace"
But if Japan opposed Stimson's scheme, it is not because
she has any love for the Soviet Union. Throughout the continuous squabbling at the London Naval Conference, the
powers were unanimous on only one point-the "Russian
menace." Edward Price Bell, correspondent for the Chicago
Daily News, describes the U.S.S.R. as a "vast invisible presence occupying the thoughts of all the delegates"; a presence
producing an "excellent effect" on the conference because
"it is tending to create a sense of community in the five powers
of highest maritime rank." He explains that Japan fears possible aggression from the Soviet Union through Siberia and
that the stronger Japan becomes "the safer it will be should
Russia turn dangerous." Italy and France, he continues, are
strongly anti-Soviet, and Germany, like Japan, fears Soviet
aggression. Therefore, says Bell, the United States and Great
Britain are protected on both flanks-in western Europe and
in the Far East-against the Soviet Union. "The peril to
either ·Britain or America from Russia may seem too remote
for practical discussion but far less remote than it seems.
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Bolshevik agitation continues ceaselessly throughout the
world."
Certainly the United States and Great Britain do not fear
military invasion from the Soviet Union. What they are
afraid of is "Bolshevik agitation"; that is, the international
working class movement. The struggle of the Indian and
Chinese masses to free themselves "from imperialist domination makes this fear particularly acute at the present moment. And it is because the Soviet Union represents the first
realization of the aspirations of the working class that the
powers plot its destruction. It is an exaggeration to state, as
Bell does, that the United States wishes to see a stronger
Japanese navy because it fears Bolshevism. The London Conference clearly showed that imperialist rivalries are keener
than ever. But acute though these differences be they do not
mitigate the danger of an imperialist attack against the Soviet
Union.
The War Danger

As we have seen, the United States and Japan, despite their
bitter rivalry in the Far East, cooperated with the White
Guards in a military expedition in 1919 to overthrow the
Soviet Government. A repetition of such an attack is more
than likely. Japan has constructed art intricate network of
railways in Manchuria which permits the rapid transportation
of thousands of troops from Korea and South Manchuria to
the Siberian border. French and British military strategists
have undoubtedly worked out similar . plans for attack from
the Baltic, Balkan and Near Eastern states. Precisely when
these plans will be put into operation, precisely when the
hatred of the imperialist powers will flare into an open war
against the Soviet Union, no one can prophesy; but it is against
this danger that the workers of the world must remain on
constant guard.
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